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Diminution in Value Is Not Inverse Condemnation:
HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court
The United States Constitution expressly forbids the taking of
private property for public use without affording the owner of the
property due process and just compensation.' California has pro-
vided even broader protection for owners of private property situ-
ated within its borders by forbidding the taking or damaging of
private property for public use without just compensation. 2 In
California the private property owner is protected from a physical
taking or damaging of his property by eminent domain exercise and
from direct physical encroachment upon use of the property.8
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V
... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only
when just compensation ascertained by a jury unless waived, has
first been paid to, or into court for, the owner ....
Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 257, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1965); Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1879);
County of San Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684, 687, 532 P.2d 139, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 491 (1975).
3. Brick v. Cazaux, 9 Cal. 2d 549, 71 P.2d 588 (1937) fee interests; San
Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. McKeegan, 265 Cal. App. 2d 263,
71 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1968) leaseholds; Dept. Pub. Wks. v. L.A. County Flood
Dist., 254 Cal. App. 2d 470, 62 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1967) easements; City of Long
Beach v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 44 Cal. 2d 599, 283 P.2d 1036 (1955) rights
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Nonetheless, private property owners may suffer a diminution in
the value of their property as a result of government action vis
6 vis zoning and not receive any compensation.4 The courts of
the United States have held that
... enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a legitimate reg-
ulation established under the police power is not a taking of prop-
erty without compensation, or without due process of law in the
sense of the 14th Amendment.5
The United States Supreme Court has also established that prop-
erty owners do not have a protected interest in the value of their
property; 6 thus, acts done in the proper exercise of government
power, although impairing the use of property and hence its value,
do not require any compensation.
7
California courts have adhered to the doctrine of non-vested
interest in value of private property as against future zoning s pro-
vided the future zoning does not affect a use of the property that
has been undertaken by the owner prior to the time of the zoning.9
of way; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 9 Cal. 3d 169, 507 P.2d 964,
107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973) building restrictions.
4. Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 319 (1932); United States v.
Cox, 190 F.2d 293, 295 (1951); HFH, LTD v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508,
542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
5. Chicago & A.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 78 (1915); Chicago
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 255 (1897); New Orleans Gaslight
Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U.S. 453, 462 (1905); Chicago B. & Q. R.
Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 591 (1906).
6. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76 (1915).
[N]o person has a vested right in any general rule of law or policy
of legislation entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged
for his benefit.
See also, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
7. Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36, 39 (1959).
[A]cts done in proper exercise of governmental powers and- not
directly encroaching upon private property, though their conse-
quences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking
within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 641 (1878); Richards
v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 554 (1914); Nunnally v. United
States, 239 F.2d 521, 523 (1956).
8. Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 88, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41
(1964).
It is settled that a property owner acquires no vested right, as
against future zoning, merely by purchasing real property.
O'Rourke v. Teeters, 63 Cal. App. 2d 349, 352, 146 P.2d 983 (1944); Price
v. Schwafel, 92 Cal. App. 2d 77, 82-85, 206 P.2d 683 (1949).
9. Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 602, 55
Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967).
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The limited existing law protects a landowner from future zoning
on "instituted use" property, but the landowner and the prac-
tioner advising the landowner must face the inevitable issue of
what exactly constitutes a protectable instituted use.'0 Further,
if the landowner's instituted use is not protected from future zon-
ing, should the landowner be allowed to state a cause of action in
inverse condemnation for diminution in value of his land caused
by a zoning change?
The California Supreme Court in the case of HFH, LTD. v.
Superior Court" restated that an instituted use is protected
against future zoning but once again failed to adequately define
the term "instituted use." Notwithstanding that omission, the
majority of the court did agree that inverse condemnation does not
lie for mere reduction in market value caused by zoning changes.
Even though numerous amici suggested significant changes in the
law of compensation concerning land use regulation, the court
refused to redefine state and federal constitutional requirements
of just compensation or to require payment for downzoning which
causes reduction in market value of private property. The court's
refusal was based on its conviction that it was the function of the
legislature to effect such changes. The court did not, however,
suggest such changes be made.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Clark offered a tripartite test
of fairness to determine whether an action for inverse condemna-
tion should be allowed for downzoning resulting in diminution in
value of private property.12  The scope of this note will be to
examine the practicality of Justice Clark's test in connection with
proposed legislation and to determine whether or not compensation
should be given for diminution in market value of private property
resulting from zoning changes.
THE CASE
Plaintiffs HFH, a limited partnership, and Vons, a Delaware
A purchaser of land merely acquires a right to continue a use
instituted before the enactment of a more restrictive zoning.
Paramount Rock Co. v. County of San Diego, 180 Cal. App. 2d 217, 232,
4 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1960).
10. The recent interest shown by various environmental groups in pre-
serving select parcels of unused realty present an interesting variation of
the possible issue of "instituted use." For example, if property is purchased
for the sole purpose of preserving its natural state, is that an "instituted
use?" One might also consider whether or not the purchase of property
for the purpose of speculation is an "instituted use" notwithstanding the
intimation contrary in the principal case at page 521.
11. HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1975).
12. Id. at 526.
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corporation, contracted to purchase a parcel of land from a common
grantor; the land was zoned for agricultural use and was unim-
proved. The sale was conditioned upon the grantor's ability to
obtain commercial zoning of the land from the City of Cerritos (the
real party in interest). The grantor procured the commercial zon-
ing and in 1966 the plaintiffs became the owners of the land.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs submitted and the city approved a parcel
map that subdivided the property in a manner appropriate for
commercial use.
In 1971, while the land was still in its undeveloped state, the city
temporarily rezoned the land for agricultural use. Plaintiffs did
not challenge the rezoning or allege an interference with any
planned use of the land. Subsequently the city adopted a general
plan indicating that some land in the area of plaintiffs' property
was appropriate for "neighborhood commercial uses." The city did
not alter the agricultural classification of plaintiffs' land. The gen-
eral plan designated the bulk of the land in the area of plaintiffs'
property for "low density residental" uses. 13
Plaintiffs concluded at that time that it would best serve their
interest to sell rather than develop their land and in early 1972
entered into a $400,000 contract of sale conditioned upon the reclass-
ification of the land to commercial use. An application for commer-
cial zoning that plaintiffs submitted to the planning commission
was rejected. An appeal to the commission and the city council
was also rejected and the property was rezoned for single family
residential use. As a consequence, the plaintiffs alleged the land
purchased by them for $388,000 suffered a decline in market value
to $75,000. Further, plaintiffs alleged that the situation of their
property rendered it "useless" for single family residential purposes.
The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend to
plaintiffs' cause of action in inverse condemnation. The plaintiffs
sought review of the order sustaining the demurrer and a writ of
mandate directing the trial court to overrule the demurrer. The
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision and stated that
inverse condemnation does not lie in zoning actions in which the
complaint alleges mere reduction in market value14 and cited sev-
13. City of Cerritos October 1971 General Plan Map; Evm. CODE § 452,
subd. (b) (West 1974).
14. HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 513, 542 P.2d 237, 125
Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
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eral previous decisions for that principle.' The court stated that
the
... rights reserved to the individual . . . are held in subordina-
tion to the rights of society. Incidental damages to property
resulting from governmental activities, or as laws passed in the
promotion of the public welfare are not considered a taking of the
property for which compensation must be made. 16
The court referred to the Morse case 1 7 in support of the proposi-
tion that landowners have no vested right in existing or anticipated
zoning ordinances.' 8 Further, the court stated that a landowner
merely has a right to a use of the property instituted before the
enactment of more restrictive zoning.' 9 The court also added that
some uncompensated hardships must be borne by individuals
as the price of living in a modern, enlightened and progressive
community. 20
Plaintiffs' argument that the city had "damaged" their property
by enactment of the zoning ordinance was rejected by the court,
who declared that the plaintiffs had failed to distinguish between
"damaged" property as required by the Constitution for compensa-
bility2' and "damages" by which courts measure the amount of
compensation due.22  The court Stated that the Constitution's
"damaged" provision was intended to reach situations in which
government activity damaged land without taking it and was not
intended to cover situations in which undamaged land has suffered
only from diminution of market value.23  In addition, the court
15. Welch v. Swassey, 214 U.S. 91, 107 (1909); Miller v. Bd. of Pub.
Wks., 195 Cal. 477, 488, 234 P. 381 (1925); McCarthy v. City of Manhattan
Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 890, 264 P.2d 932 (1953); Consolidated Rock Products
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 530, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr.
638 (1962); Selby v. City of San Bernadino, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 127, 514 P.2d
111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973); State of California v. Superior Court
(VETA), 12 Cal. 3d 237, 252-53, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974).
16. Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Wks., 195 Cal. 477, 488, 234 P. 381 (1925).
17. Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 602, 55
Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967).
18. Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 88-90, 40 Cal. Rptr.
41 (1964).
19. Livingston Rock Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 127,
272 P.2d 4 (1954).
20. Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 222 Cal. App. 2d 508, 518, 35
Cal. Rptr. 480 (1963); Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App.
2d 600, 602-03, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967).
21. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
22. HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 518, 542 P.2d 237, 125
Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
Reasoning backwards, plaintiffs erroneously contend that since they
can calculate damages (by measuring decline in market value),
they must have been damaged within the meaning of the
state Constitution.
23. Id.
S214
[VOL. 3: S210, 1976] Related Article
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEL
stated that the basic equitable principles of fairness 24 are not
abused by this holding because
• ..the long settled state of zoning law renders the possibility of
change in zoning clearly forseeable to land speculators and other
purchasers of property, who discount . value by the probabil-
ity of such change. 25
Justice Clark, in a dissenting opinion,26 urged that the "or
damaged" language in the Constitution 27 is not limited to mere
physical damage but encompasses something more than either
direct or immediate damage. 28 Further, Justice Clark stated that
the government should pay for property value it has impaired or
destroyed. 29 The point at which an injury is compensable, he
stated, is determined by balancing two fundamental, yet inconsis-
tent, policy considerations: the policy of distribution of individual
loss for public improvements by redistributing such loss throughout
the community and the policy that liberal compensation will
seriously impede or stop beneficial public improvements because of
increased costY0
In reviewing these conflicting policy considerations, the fact that
both state and federal constitutions31 require compensation to the
individual who has lost his property because of a taking or damag-
ing by government activity cannot be ignored. These constitutional
rights should not be abrogated because the government finds it
more convenient and less expensive to ignore the individual's rights.
It should not matter at all that the government's cost will be in-
24. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973).
The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as
much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it
does from the technical concepts of property law.
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950);
Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 9 Cal. 3d 169, 175, 507 P.2d 964, 107
Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973).
25. HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 523, 542 P.2d 237, 125
Cal Rptr. 365 (1975); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com-
ment on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
RzV. 165, 195-96 (1967).
26. HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 523, 542 P.2d 237, 125
Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
27. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 19.
28. Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 501, 6 P. 317 (1885).
29. Id. at 503; Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 351, 144 P.2d
818 (1943).
30. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
S215
creased or its convenience hampered in exercising its police power
through zoning when constitutional guarantees are at stake. Absent
some compelling reason, such as a national emergency, the police
power must yield to the Constitution's commands.
Any increase in the cost of zoning may be met by local govern-
ment increasing its property tax assessments or by alternative
taxes. As stated by Professor Michelman in his noted law review
article: 32
... [Ilt would appear that any measure which society cannot
afford or,, putting it another way, is unwilling to finance under
conditions of full compensation, society cannot afford at all.
Basic principles of fairness suggest that no individual member of
a democratic society should be made to bear alone a financial bur-
den that is incurred for the benefit of the entire society. Thus,
the financial cost of a public improvement should be equitably
distributed throughout society. The ultimate test of whether com-
pensation is required in downzoning cases resolves itself into one
of constitutional principles and fairness.83
Justice Clark conceded that not all governmental activity that
adversely affects property values must be compensated.3 4 Govern-
mental activity, to be exempt, would have to lie beyond the para-
meters of his tripartite test of fairness.35 This tripartite test would
require compensation when by public action (1) land has suffered
substantial decrease in value, (2) the decrease is of long or potenti-
ally infinite duration and (3) the owner will incur more than his
fair share of the financial burden incident to such decrease in
value.8 6 By applying this test to the facts before him, Justice Clark
concluded that an eighty percent decrease in market value was sub-
stantial, that the decrease was of a long or potentially infinite dura-
tion and that the plaintiffs would incur more than their fair share
32. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comment on the Ethi-
cal Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 165 (1967).
33. County of San Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684, 689, 532 P.2d 139, 119
Cal. Rptr. 491 (1975); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 9 Cal. 3d 169,
173-75, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973).
34. HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 526, 542 P.2d 237, 125
Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413(1922).
35. HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 526, 542 P.2d 237, 125
Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975); see also, United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490
(1973); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124
(1950); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 9 Cal. 3d 169, 175, 507 P.2d
964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973).
36. HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 526, 542 P.2d 237, 125
Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
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of the financial burden. Thus, Justice Clark would have granted
the writ directing the lower court to overrule the demurrer.37
The underlying issue of whether inverse condemnation should lie
for diminution in market value caused by downzoning was success-
fully avoided by the majority, who suggested that such change
should come from the legislature.38 Although Justice Clark favors
compensation for reduction in market value of certain downzoned
property, the elements of his test are illusory. Just what consti-
tutes a "substantial decrease in value of long or potentially infinite
duration" is as subjective as "a fair share of the financial burden."
However, the test offered by Justice Clark might be workable given
a legislative definition of "substantial decrease in value."
The argument for legislative change and a standard test for
compensation in a case such as HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court finds
much support in the "or damaged" clause of the California Consti-
tution.39 Downzoning private property from residential to agricul-
tural use or from commercial to residential use, for example, truly
will damage the property insofar as its beneficial use is concerned,
as much as if the state built a facility adjoining a residentially
zoned parcel which rendered the parcel unfit for human habitation.
One of the reasons for not requiring compensation in downzoning
cases is that some incidental damage to private property caused by
zoning is inconsequential, i.e., the diminished value of the property
affected is de minimus. If compensation was to be required in each
instance where property values were only slightly affected, the
result would be a flood of nuisance claims for compensation against
the zoning authority. Local government would be in the position
of either having to pay these claims or rescinding legitimate zoning
ordinances for financial reasons. Ultimately, government zoning
could become prohibitively expensive because of nuisance claims
or ineffective because of self-imposed restrictions to avoid the added
expense. It might also be argued that any change in a zoning
ordinance concerning a particular parcel must necessarily affect
neighboring parcels, some of them adversely. However, these argu-
ments are inherently weak; the former fails to recognize that the
legislature could set a standard by which damages would or would
37. Id. at 527.
38. Id. at 522.
39. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
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not be considered inconsequential and the latter can be dealt with
by a proximate cause analysis.
A proximate cause analysis in a downzoning situation, like its
tort counterpart, could be utilized to limit the liability of the zoning
agency to compensation for adversely affected parcels within the
immediate physical vicinity of the downzoned parcel. 40 Of course,
the problem that immediately presents itself is the definition to
be given to the term "immediate physical vicinity." The solution
to this definitional problem could be dealt with on a judicial case
by case basis or by legislation. Difficulties that would be encoun-
tered with the case method would be lack of uniform decisions,
expensive and time consuming litigation and vague standards. On
the other hand, a legislative definition must necessarily be arbitrary
because of the elusiveness of the term "immediate physical
vicinity."
Because an inflexible legislative definition of the term "imme-
diate physical vicinity" may operate harshly against property lying
beyond a fixed area, such as one square mile or even ten square
miles, a compromise between legislative fiat and judicial discretion
would serve the purpose of defining the term and affording relief
to those property owners who would suffer hardship simply because
their property fortuitously lay outside a defined boundary. "Imme-
diate physical vicinity" could be legislatively defined as that area
within one square mile of the downzoned parcel, except in those
instances determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to merit
special consideration as a matter of public policy; such a definition
would adequately dispose of litigation concerning affected land
within one square mile of the downzoned parcel, while at the same
time allowing flexibility for "hardship" cases.4 1 Further, the pro-
posed definition would afford clear notice to landowners and zoning
agencies alike that diminution in value of property located within
one square mile of a downzoned parcel will be conclusively pre-
sumed to have been proximately caused by the downzoning; it
would also give notice that a court of competent jurisdiction may
extend the one square mile limitation upon a showing that special
consideration, as a matter of public policy, should be given.
40. See, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CAL. L.
REv. 229 (1932).
41. The author is aware that any proposed physical boundary is, of
course, arbitrary. Nonetheless, a limitation of one square mile is no more
arbitrary than legislation that makes a person below the age of eighteen
years legally incompetent to contract. The proposed definition will define
the outer limits of "immediate physical vicinity" while remaining flexible
enough to accommodate hardship situations.
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If one accepts the premise that government should compensate
for damages proximately caused by downzoning, the measure of
damages can also be ascertained by legislation utilizing Justice
Clark's test. That legislation would simply define what Justice
Clark termed a "substantial decrease in value." Obviously, the term
encompasses a decrease in value down to zero. The problem is at
what point before the decrease reaches zero will it be considered
substantial?
The problem presented by a legislative definition of "substantial
decrease in value" is twofold. The first part of the term "substan-
tial decrease" must be defined separately from the second part of
the term "value." Once again a legislative standard will be arbi-
trary. However, recognized economic factors, such as the legal rate
of interest prevailing in the United States, may be used in defining
"substantial decrease." For example, a substantial decrease may be
said to exist whenever the value of property is lessened beyond the
acquisition cost of the property together with the legal rate of inter-
est compounded annually from the date of acquisition of the prop-
erty. Thus, if downzoning occurred in 1973 and the legal rate of
interest remained seven percent through 1975 and the property was
acquired in 1973 at a cost of $100,000, any decrease in value below
$114,490 would be conclusively presumed to be a substantial
decrease. 42
The second part of any legislative definition of "substantial
decrease in value" must succintly define the term "value." It is
obvious that zoning agencies and landowners would find it benefi-
cial to their respective interests to assert as appropriate different
values. Zoning agencies might claim the cost of the property at
acquisition as appropriate and landowners might assert potential
market value as more appropriate. It is fortunate that there does
exist an equitable middle ground between these extremes. This
middle ground, used in eminent domain proceedings, is the cur-
42. If $100,000 is invested in 1973 at 7% per annum, it would accrue
$14,490 interest at the end of 1975. Thus, principal plus interest on such
an investment at the end of two years would total $114,490.
The legal rate of interest is suggested by the author as a logical standard
in that a prudent investor would hope to obtain at least the prevailing legal
rate of interest on an investment. No less of a return on investment should
be expected by a private property owner.
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rent fair market value of the property.43 The current fair market
value of the property at the time of the zoning complained of can
be adduced at a hearing after both the zoning agency and the land-
owner have mutually selected an independent expert evaluator.
By utilizing the concept of current fair market value in its defini-
tion of "substantial decrease in value" the legislature can avoid
bestowing a windfall on either the public through the zoning
agency or on the private property owner.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Proposed legislation utilizing Justice Clark's test might read:
There shall exist a civil remedy in inverse condemnation for any
private property owner whenever by public action:
(1) Such owner's real property has suffered a substantial decrease
in value, which decrease will be presumed upon a showing by
such owner that the current fair market value of his property
at the time of the public action has decreased below the sum
of the cost of acquisition of such property and interest there-
on, compounded at the legal rate or rates prevailing during the
period of time for which such property was held; and
(2) Such decrease in value is of long or potentially infinite dura-
tion and, in any event, not less than one calendar year from
the time of the public action; and
(3) The property affected lies within one square mile of the
downzoned parcel or is determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, as a matter of public policy, to lay within the
immediate physical vicinity of the downzoned parcel.
Application of the proposed legislation to the facts presented in
HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court44 would have resulted in recovery
for the plaintiffs, since the parcel involved had been diminished
in current fair market value at the time of the zoning in excess
of eighty percent (current fair market value prior to the zoning
was $388,000, which dropped to $75,000 after the zoning), the parcel
had decreased in value beyond the one calendar year requirement
and the parcel lay within the physical boundary. This would have
been a more equitable result.
The impact of any such proposed legislation undoubtedly would
be far-reaching. It cannot be disputed that, to accomplish legiti-
mate zoning objectives in community land use planning, local
government will be forced to compensate heretofore uncompen-
sated property owners whose property values have diminished
because of zoning ordinances. Further, local government will be
43. CAL. CODE OF CrvIL PROCEDURE § 1249 (West 1972); see also, San Diego
Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 88 Cal. 50, 25 P. 977 (1891).
44. HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1975).
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put to the added expense of increased administrative cost in either
assessing and collecting additional taxes or in implementing other
revenue raising measures to meet the cost engendered by the pro-
posed legislation. It is possible that certain desired zoning changes
will not be affected because of the anticipated cost of compensat-
ing private property owners. On the positive side, however, the
proposed legislation will encourage more responsible government
vis d vis careful land use planning if only to avoid the increased
cost of compensation. rn addition, the cost of public improvements
will be ratably distributed to all who benefit from such improve-
ments.
DANIEL J. GAVIN*
* Daniel J. Gavin is a third-year student.
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